MW amount of a dc transaction.
Parameter vector (column) representing the base amounts of all types of dc transactions. Column vector containing the HVDC flows at the solution point of the previous FTR auction. Column vector containing the forward capacities (as available in the day-ahead market) of HVDC lines. Column vector containing the reverse capacities (as available in the day-ahead market) of HVDC lines. Column vector containing the net nodal injections caused by the physical equivalents of ARRs. Parameter vector (column) representing the net nodal inelastic loads in the day-ahead market. Column vector containing the net nodal injections caused by the physical equivalents of cashed FTRs. Variable vector (column) signifying the net nodal injections caused by .
constant matrix that converts nodal injections into ac line flows.
constant matrix that converts dc transactions into ac line flows. Variable vector (column) signifying the awarded amounts towards all the FTR requests. Variable vector (column) signifying the awarded amounts towards the obligation FTR requests. Variable vector (column) signifying the awarded amounts towards the option FTR requests. Parameter vector (column) indicating the increment on towards . Upper limit on . Parameter vector (column) representing the pre-existing (i.e., existing before the auction) amounts of all types of FTRs involved in the auction. Parameter vector (column) representing the base amounts of all types of FTRs involved in the auction.
column vector of all ones. Column vector containing the ac-line capacities available in the day-ahead market. Forward capacity (as available in the day-ahead market) of a certain ac line. Reverse capacity (as available in the day-ahead market) of a certain ac line. Total number of nodes in the system. Sensitivity factor between th node and th line. Zero vector of dimension . Value of the scalar or vector variable (.) at the solution point of the power dispatch problem.
Value of the scalar or vector variable (.) at the solution point of the FTR auction problem. Social-welfare function.
Optimal social-welfare as a function of and . Objective function of an FTR auction.
Optimal value of as a function of and .
I. INTRODUCTION
C ONGESTION management in restructured power system can be done efficiently through locational marginal price (LMP) based energy pricing. LMP mechanism was first invented by Hogan in 1992 [1] . Several LMP decomposition techniques were later described by other researchers [2] - [7] . The basis of the LMP mechanism is the theory of spot pricing by Schweppe et al. [8] . In the locational marginal pricing approach, dispatch schedules are calculated through social welfare maximization within the available network capacity. Each pool participant has to pay to (if it is a load) or is paid by (if it is a generator) the independent system operator (ISO) the LMP at its location; whereas each bilateral contract has to pay a network usage charge (congestion charge plus loss charge) depending upon the LMP difference between its sink and source locations. This kind of energy pricing can generate appropriate price signals for identifying suitable locations to build new generators and loads. Also, due to a centralized joint optimization based dispatch calculation, transmission capacities are allocated in an optimal way to the energy market participants.
LMP mechanism needs the support of certain risk hedging instrument. This is because LMP mechanism inherently creates price risk (in the form of unpredictable network usage charges) especially for the long term forward contracts. This may hamper long term power trading. However, long term (or, at least, medium term) forward contracts are always desirable so far as market competitiveness is concerned. They have an important role to play in curbing market power [9] - [11] . Therefore, some complementary methodology or tool is required to safeguard long term and medium term forward contracts under locational marginal pricing environment.
Financial transmission right (FTR) [1] , [12] and the flowgate right (FGR) [13] mechanisms are the two alternative approaches to provide price-guards to the forward contracts. However, both of these instruments are able to provide hedge only against the congestion component of the LMP differential (i.e., price risk due to network loss can not be eliminated). FTRs are of point-to-point nature, whereas FGRs are link-based. Therefore, the tradability of an individual FGR is higher than that of an FTR. But, FGR mechanism has some significant drawbacks [14] , [15] due to which it may not suitable for a meshed system. As a result, most of the successfully running LMP markets (like PJM, New York, New England and others) have found the FTR mechanism to be more suitable for their systems as compared to the FGR mechanism [16] - [20] .
Although LMP and FTR mechanisms are well-established for a system having only ac lines, very little work has been reported so far to bring high voltage dc (HVDC) lines under these mechanisms. The generalized LMP evaluation techniques presented in [2] - [7] did not address the important financial issues like the net position of ISO in the congestion collection and the revenue adequate issuance of FTRs. Such an analysis was explicitly carried out in [12] for a general power flow model, but with the assumption that the injection at a node can never hit its lower and upper limits as considered in the power dispatch problem. This may not be a valid assumption as at certain hours, the injection at a node may be at one limit. More prominently, if the load at a certain node is inelastic, the injection at this node always remains at limit. This is because the upper and lower limits for a variable representing an inelastic load must be the same. It is also important to consider the limits on bilateral transactions in the analysis. Moreover, the inconsistency of the LMP-FTR mechanism with ac power flow model with regard to the above financial issues was proven by Hiskens et al. [21] by means of counterexamples.
The commonly employed model of LMP-FTR mechanism is built upon the dc power flow approximation [7] and [22] , and is financially consistent. However, the fundamental assumption behind this model is that the network under regulation (under the control of ISO) contains only ac lines. HVDC lines, which are under private control (i.e., unregulated), can be taken into account within this framework by means of proxy transaction bids from the line owners. However, as the flow over a regulated line has to be controlled by the ISO himself, the existing framework becomes insufficient if the network contains or is expanded with regulated HVDC lines. The implementability of LMP-FTR mechanism in an ac-dc system is investigated in this work addressing all the associated financial issues carefully. Additionally, a comparison is carried out between private and regulated HVDC lines. For the sake of simplicity, network loss is not considered in the LMP calculation. Here, the term "ac-dc system" indicates a system with regulated HVDC lines, and from now onward, the term "HVDC line" will generally be used to indicate a regulated HVDC line.
The organization of this paper is as follows: Network modeling is discussed in Section II. The power dispatch model is described and analyzed in Section III. Implementation of FTRs in an ac-dc system is discussed in Section IV. A case study is presented in Section V. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section VI.
II. NETWORK MODELING
The flow over an HVDC line can be controlled explicitly. Therefore, the HVDC flow from th node to th node can alternatively be thought of as a non-chargeable (i.e., not to be imposed any congestion charge) bilateral transaction from th node to th node. Such a virtual transaction can be called as a dc transaction. The MW flow over the HVDC line defines the transacted amount in this equivalent transaction model. The upper and lower limits on the MW amount of this virtual transaction are also defined by the upper and lower flow limits, respectively, of the relevant line. Therefore, the original hybrid network is now reduced to a fully ac network. However, elimination of HVDC lines may divide the system into multiple islands. The system connectivity can be restored by creating some dummy connections of 0 MW ac lines. Although such dummy connections are not indispensable, they, in effect, eliminate the extra job of associating loads, generations and transactions to appropriate islands. Also, it is not required to find and call a separate sensitivity matrix for each island. Connected system model is also assumed in the traditional formulation of LMP-FTR mechanism. Next, the node-branch sensitivity factors are to be calculated for this reduced network both under base and contingent network conditions. The sensitivity of a line flow to a path can be determined by simply subtracting the sink sensitivity from the source sensitivity. It should be noted that, in the energy market, a path is defined by a source-sink pair rather than an alternating series of nodes and lines.
Contingencies in the ac portion of the network (i.e., set of ac lines) can be classified into two categories, say Type 1 and Type 2. In case of a Type 1 contingency, an ac line is completely lost. However, the impedance of an ac line gets partially changed when a Type 2 contingency occurs. Type 2 contingency basically can occur on a lumped line (i.e., when a set of physical lines is lumped into a single line). The power dispatch algorithm may also consider contingencies in the dc portion of the network (i.e., set of dc lines). In case any contingency (like outage of one pole) occurs in an HVDC line, the flow over it falls below the pre-contingency level. This can be modeled as the loss of a certain fraction of the MW amount of the equivalent transaction. Note that there is a certain difference between a dc transaction and a regular (i.e., explicitly specified by a market participant) bilateral transaction. Unlike a dc transaction, the MW amount of a regular bilateral transaction can never be lost (as considered in the dispatch model). Now, the MW loss of a dc transaction can be further modeled as the change of its impacts on ac-line flows. For example, let fraction of a dc transaction of MW on path gets lost due to some contingency. Therefore, the flow caused by this transaction on ac-line changes from MW to MW. This in turn indicates an equivalent change of sensitivity from to . It should be noted that this modeled sensitivity is not same as the path sensitivity.
III. POWER DISPATCH MODEL
In a centralized market with locational marginal pricing, the pool market and the bilateral contracts are cleared simultaneously by maximizing the joint social welfare function within the available network capacity. Under this approach, generation and load bids are invited from the pool participants, whereas the bilateral contracts have the choice to submit "up to congestion charge" bids. Any bid consists of a requested quantity and a bid price. In addition, there may be some price-insensitive generations, loads and bilateral transactions. The social welfare function is formed by assuming that each generation bid corresponds to a marginal cost function and each load or transaction bid corresponds to a marginal benefit function. Apart from base network constraints, there must be a separate set of capacity con-straints for each possible contingent condition of the network. The power dispatch problem can be compactly written as
where if is a generation at bus if is a load at bus if is not related to bus Constraints (1) are the capacity constraints for the ac portion of the network. The matrix converts nodal injections into ac-line flows both for the assigned forward as well as reverse directions of the lines. Similarly, dc transactions are converted into ac-line flows by the matrix . The elements of are the ac-line loading limits as available in the day-ahead market. The value of the parameter vector is always zero. Constraint (2) is the power balance constraint. The vector is converted into nodal injections (by the matrix ) in constraints (3) and the other constraints are self-explanatory. Now, the Lagrangian of this optimization problem can be written as where and are the vectors of Lagrangian multipliers. The LMP at a node is defined as the rate of decrease of optimal social welfare with respect to the increase of fixed (or inelastic) load at that node. Therefore, from the theory of perturbation analysis [23] (8)
Each pool participant has to pay (load) or is paid (generator) the LMP at its location. For a bilateral transaction, the market player has to pay a congestion charge. The per MW congestion charge to be imposed on a bilateral transaction is given by the rate of decrease of optimal social welfare with respect to the increase of price-insensitive transaction on the corresponding path. Therefore, this charge is equal to the sink LMP minus the source LMP. The net congestion collection (NCC) of the ISO is given by the sum of the payments made by the bilateral contracts, plus the sum of the payments made by the loads, minus the sum of the payments made to generators, i.e., (9) According to complementary slackness condition of KKT rule [23] and [24] (10) Remember that is a zero vector. Therefore, the expression for NCC can be finally written as (11) Note that no congestion charge is imposed on any dc transaction. This is because each dc transaction, in essence, corresponds to the power flow over a regulated transmission line. However, the per MW congestion charge that is otherwise applicable to the th dc transaction can be calculated as (12) As the bid price associated with is zero (i.e., the coefficient of in the objective function is zero) and as and , the following properties of can be observed:
, then . From the above properties of , it can be easily verified that the value of (or ) can be either negative or zero. Furthermore, is always non-negative. This, in conjunction with (11) , clearly indicates that the net congestion collection can never be negative.
It is an important point to mention that the dummy ac lines of 0 MW capacities may sometimes create numerical problem for the optimization solver. This is because the forward flow limit and reverse flow limit constraints for a dummy line are collectively equivalent to a single equality constraint. Such numerical problem can be avoided by directly converting the forward flow limit constraint for a dummy ac line into an equality constraint and simultaneously removing its reverse flow limit constraint, or vice-versa. This step should appear in the program before the optimization solver is called. At the end of the optimization calculation, the Lagrangian multiplier of such an TABLE I  LINE INFORMATION   TABLE II  BID INFORMATION equality constraint has to be represented as the sum of a positive number and a negative number. The positive number will give the Lagrangian multiplier of the converted flow limit constraint, whereas the modulus of the negative number will give the Lagrangian multiplier of the removed flow limit constraint.
Example 1: Consider a five-node system. Node 5 is the reference node. The ac and dc line information of this system is given in Table I . The generator, load and bilateral transaction bids that are submitted in a certain day-ahead market are shown in Table II . In addition, there is an inelastic load of 50 MW at Node 2.
Here, , ,
The social welfare function can be written as The values of and are 0 and 5, respectively. Note that , whereas . Finally, the net congestion collection can be calculated as
IV. FINANCIAL TRANSMISSION RIGHTS
As mentioned earlier, the objective of FTRs is to guard forward contracts from the uncertain congestion charges. The basic parameters defining an FTR are a source, a sink, a validity period and a MW amount. With regard to hedging adjustability, currently exercised FTRs can be classified into two categories-options and obligations. An obligation FTR is basically a fixed hedge FTR that always participates in the cash settlement. On the contrary, an option FTR is an adjustable hedge FTR that can be cashed only when congestion occurs in the forward direction. Irrespective of whether it is an option or an obligation, the value of a cashed FTR is always given by the product of its MW amount and the LMP differential on its path. In case an FTR is not cashed, its value automatically becomes zero. Therefore, an obligation FTR may incur negative value at certain hours due to the occurrence of congestion in the reverse direction, whereas the value of an option FTR is always non-negative. While an obligation FTR alone is able to hedge a fixed transaction only, a band of transactions can be fully hedged by the portfolio of an obligation and an option FTRs. Now, in this section, we will look into the implementability of FTR mechanism in an HVDC-embedded system.
A. Simultaneous Feasibility Test
Revenue adequacy is an important consideration regarding the issuance of financial transmission rights. There should be enough collection from the network congestion for paying full FTR credits. For a fully ac system, revenue adequacy can be ensured by means of a well known mechanism called simultaneous feasibility test (SFT) which can be stated as: If the network capacity available in a day-ahead market is sufficient to accommodate the power flow caused by the physical equivalents of cashed FTRs at the relevant hour, the congestion collection (day-ahead) must be greater than or equal to the total FTR target payment at this hour. Even if the system contains HVDC lines, revenue adequacy can be ensured by conducting SFT on the ac portion of the network. Now, revenue adequacy will not get threatened if HVDC lines are also included in the simultaneous feasibility test. This general relationship between simultaneous feasibility test and revenue adequacy is established below.
Let the net injection pattern
caused by the cashed FTRs results in a feasible power flow condition within the overall network capacity (ac as well as dc) available in the day-ahead energy market. Therefore (13) where is a particular instance of and . The total target payment (TTP) towards these FTRs can be calculated as (14) where The vector contains the ac-line flows which are collectively caused by and . The surplus amount (SA) of the congestion collection is given by (15) where can be expressed as (16) (16) , the value of is then non-positive. Furthermore, according to the non-negativity condition of , the value of can never be negative. Therefore (17) Equation (17) clearly indicates revenue adequacy. It should be noted that conducting SFT only on the ac-network portion is just a specific application of this general SFT model, where is forcefully maintained at zero.
Example 2:
Consider the same power dispatch problem as discussed in Example 1. The cashed FTRs at the relevant hour are a 100 MW FTR from 1 to 3, a 250 MW FTR from 4 to 2, and a 100 MW FTR from 5 to 3. In case these FTRs are tested for simultaneous feasibility only on the ac portion of the network, overloading can be observed on Lines A1 and A6. However, simultaneous feasibility can be restored by utilizing the capacities of dc lines. For example, the ac-line flows can be brought back within their limits by adjusting the HVDC-line flows to 120 MW and 50 MW, respectively, in their forward directions (i.e., and ). Therefore, these FTRs should be revenue adequate. Now, the total target payment towards these FTRs can be calculated as $1333, and the figure clearly illustrates the revenue adequacy.
B. Auction Formulation
Auction and allocation are two alternative mechanisms for issuing FTRs. Without losing generality, we will restrict our discussion only to formulation of auction problem. The objective of an FTR-auction problem is to minimize the negated value of the quote-based sum of the issued amounts towards the FTR bids. The cleared amount towards each bid must lie within its lower (which is zero) and upper (which is the requested amount) limits. In order to ensure revenue adequacy, simultaneous feasibility condition must be satisfied while issuing FTRs. The simultaneous feasibility condition can be stated as: The physical equivalent of each possible active-inactive combination of individual FTRs (base as well as requested) must result in a feasible power flow condition for each possible topological scenario of the network. Here, for the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that all the FTRs are issued for a same set of hours. The base FTRs are those entities whose quantity values are considered as constants during the auction calculation. As an example, the FTR awarded to a market participant in an annual auction is to be considered as a base FTR in the subsequent monthly auctions. Similarly, a self-scheduled (self-scheduling means getting an FTR without worrying about its price) FTR is a base entity in an auction. FTR surrenders (surrendering means returning an FTR to ISO with the willingness to accept any payment for this returned FTR) are also considered through base case modeling by subtracting the surrendered amounts from the original FTR amounts.
Note that we have to consider different active-inactive combinations of individual FTRs. This is because of option FTRs (an option FTR becomes inactive if congestion occurs in the reverse direction). Similarly, different topological conditions of the network have to be considered in order to take " " contingencies into account. Now, using dc power flow model, the simultaneous feasibility constraints for a certain ac line under a particular network topology can be written as (18) where , , and
. The above formulation of simultaneous feasibility constraints is a natural extension of the earlier (i.e., for fully ac systems) formulation [25] - [27] for making utilization of the capacities of HVDC lines. The upper and lower limits of each dc transaction are, in addition, to be respected. Now, it can be easily verified that it is not possible to issue option FTRs between two zones across a dummy ac line. Therefore, as for the power dispatch calculation (see Section III), the forward and reverse SFT constraints corresponding to a dummy ac line should be compressed into a single equality constraint before proceeding for the optimization calculation.
C. Auction Pricing
Financial transmission rights are priced following the same marginal pricing rule as followed for energy pricing [18] . The auction optimization problem for an ac-dc system can be compactly formulated as minimize (19) (20)
Here, the vector contains all the requested obligation and option FTR terms. Constraints (19) are the simultaneous feasibility constraints. and contain the loading factors (i.e., coefficient factors) of the requested and base FTR terms, respectively, in simultaneous feasibility constraints. Now, the Lagrangian of this optimization problem can be written as The price of an FTR similar to can be calculated as (24) In general, two FTRs are said to be similar if they have the same loading factor in any simultaneous feasibility constraint. Therefore, according to (24) , the price of an FTR can be simply calculated by taking the sum of the products of its loading factor and constraint shadow price over all the simultaneous feasibility constraints. The auction participant pays or is paid this price depending upon whether this FTR is issued or bought back, respectively, by the ISO. The net auction collection (NAC) of the ISO can be calculated as (25) where From the complementary slackness condition, the expression for NAC can be reduced to (26) where Here, , and indicate the network capacity offered to the market participants in this auction. Again, note that a dc transaction is not charged as it corresponds to the power flow over a regulated line. However, the per MW charge that is otherwise applicable to the th dc transaction can be calculated as (27) As the bid price associated with is zero and as and , the following properties of can be observed: 1) if (i.e., ), then . 2) if (i.e., ), then . 3) if (i.e., ), then . From the above properties of , it can be easily verified (on the same line as NCC has been proven to be non-negative) that the net auction collection must be non-negative if , and .
D. Auction Revenue Right
Auction revenue right (ARR) is a mechanism through which the proceeds from an FTR auction are distributed among the firm transmission customers. For example, in PJM [18] , ARR mechanism is used to distribute the annual auction collections among the firm point-to-point and network service customers. ARR mechanism is basically an indirect method for the allocation of FTRs. Each ARR is defined between a certain source-sink pair and for a certain MW amount. The value of an ARR is given by the product of the LMP differential on its path and its MW amount. Note that here the term "LMP difference" indicates the obligation FTR price on the ARR path. By definition, each ARR is an obligation, i.e., an ARR may incur negative value. The total target payment towards the ARRs can be calculated as (28) In order to ensure revenue adequate auction collection, simultaneous feasibility must be checked while issuing ARRs. The physical equivalents of the issued ARRs should then result in a feasible power flow condition within the network capacity offered in the corresponding FTR auction. For the generalized SFT model, the feasibility of ARRs can be mathematically stated as (29) where is a particular instance of and . The relationship between simultaneous feasibility and revenue adequacy for ARRs can be proven in the same way as has been done for FTRs.
V. CASE STUDY
A case study is performed on IEEE standard 30-bus system to assess relative impact of a regulated HVDC line and a private HVDC line on the locational marginal prices. Excepting Lines 3-4, 4-6 and 9-10, the capacity of each line is taken as 80 MW. Each of the Lines 3-4, 4-6 and 9-10 has a capacity of 60 MW. The sample energy bids are presented in Table III . Additionally, there are some price-insensitive loads at Buses 3, 5, 7, 8, 12, 13, 21, 27 , and some price-insensitive generations at Buses 3 and 8. Each price-insensitive load or generation is of 10 MW. The spatial distribution of locational marginal prices for the base system configuration is shown in Fig. 1 by the solid-line curve. For the sake of simplicity, no contingency case is considered in the dispatch model.
Next, an HVDC line of 100 MW capacity is connected between Nodes 11 and 27. The asterisked curve in Fig. 1 shows the modified LMP distribution in case this HVDC line is under regulatory control. Note that the LMP variation shown by the aster- isked curve is less than that shown by the solid-lined curve. Now, consider the case that this HVDC line is private. In this case, the owner of this line has to submit proxy-transaction bids for allowing the usage of this line. There should be one transaction bid on Path 27-11 for the forward capacity of the line, and another transaction bid on Path 11-27 for the reverse capacity of the line. The bid price (indicated by ) for these proxy-transaction bids can not be positive. This is because the line owner, being a rational person, can never choose to pay money while offering the capacity of his line. The LMP distribution when is shown in Fig. 1 by the dashed (or broken) curve. The LMP variation shown by this curve is intermediate to the LMP variations shown by the other two curves. The variance of LMP distribution as a function of is plotted in Fig. 2 . The curve is drawn by connecting the individual points obtained by varying from 0 with 0.01 decrements. The curve is monotonically increasing with and saturates after with the variance 18.3006, which is also the variance of LMP distribution when this HVDC line is absent. The Y-coordinate value of the lowest point on this curve is 3.8322 which is also the variance of LMP distribution in case the HVDC line would have been regulated. It is clear that the LMP variance at any point on the curve in Fig. 2 is no less than that when this HVDC line is regulated and no greater than that when this HVDC line is absent.
The above results can be explained in the following way:In case the system is expanded with a regulated HVDC line, no additional bid term, apart from the previous bid terms, appears in the social welfare function. Therefore, the value of the unconstrained (i.e., without considering the ac-line limits) optimal social welfare (UOSW) as well as the unconstrained solution for the original bid variables (USOBV) remains unaltered. Even if the newly connected HVDC line is private, UOSW and USOBV still remain the same although two additional bid terms are now added to the social welfare function. This is because the coefficient factors of the proxy-transaction bid variables in the social welfare function are always non-positive. Now, the free control offered by a regulated HVDC line increases (or, at least, retains same) the value of the constrained optimal social wel- fare (COSW). In case of a private HVDC line, COSW is maximum when , and at that point this line behaves just as a regulated HVDC line. The value of COSW then decreases monotonically up to a certain lower limit as moves in the negative direction. This lower limit is defined by the value of the constrained optimal social welfare when this HVDC line is absent. For our case, (COSW/UOSW) versus plot is presented in Fig. 3 . The curve is monotonically decreasing with , and saturates after . The highest and lowest values of (COSW/UOSW) on this curve are 0.7515 and 0.6595, respectively. In case of the regulatory control on this HVDC line, the value of (COSW/UOSW) is 0.7515, and in case this HVDC line is absent, the value of (COSW/UOSW) is 0.6595. Now, the comparison between Figs. 2 and 3 reveals that the spatial LMP variation decreases monotonically as COSW moves closer to UOSW. In fact, there is a common relationship between COSW and spatial LMP variation. Let a power dispatch problem be modified, without excluding any original bid term, in such a way that UOSW and USOBV remain unaltered. Now, following are some general observations: 1) spatial LMP variation increases (or remains same) if COSW gets decreased; 2) spatial LMP variation decreases (or remains same) if COSW gets increased; 3) spatial LMP variation remains unaltered if COSW does not get changed at all. As a simple example, if the flow limits of ac lines are increased, the value of COSW also gets increased; consequently, the spatial variation of locational marginal prices becomes lower. Therefore, the final conclusion is that expanding a system with any HVDC line usually brings the locational marginal prices closer to one another, and the lowest possible LMP variation is obtained if this HVDC line is kept under regulatory control.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have developed a framework for the implementation of LMP-FTR mechanism in a system containing regulated HVDC lines. The ability to control the flow over an HVDC line makes it possible to model this line-flow as a nonchargeable bilateral transaction. We call this transaction as dc transaction. Any contingency in an HVDC line can be modeled as the alteration of the impacts of its equivalent transaction on ac-line flows. In order to obtain the power dispatch schedules and the locational marginal prices, social welfare should be maximized within the available capacity of the entire regulated network. Although none of the dc transactions makes any congestion payment, net collection from system congestion would be still non-negative. This is because the congestion charge which is otherwise applicable to a dc transaction can never be positive as the bid price associated with it is zero.
Locational marginal pricing of energy must be complemented by financial transmission rights for guarding forward contracts against uncertain congestion charges. Financial transmission rights should be issued in such a way so that revenue shortfall may not occur. For ac systems, a simultaneous feasibility test model is already well established for the revenue adequate issuance of FTRs. The same SFT model is also applicable to an ac-dc system, but by ignoring the dc portion of the network. Therefore, it is not able to utilize the capacities of the HVDC lines. We have developed a more general SFT model that can effectively utilize the capacity of the whole network. The FTR auction model is accordingly modified to include the HVDC terms. The net auction collection would be still greater than or equal to zero in case the line capacities offered in the auction are all non-negative. The extended SFT model can further be used for the revenue adequate issuance of auction revenue rights.
